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Silicon physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are security primitives relying
on the intrinsic randomness of IC manufacturing. Strong PUFs have a very large
input-output space which is essential for secure authentication. Several proposed
strong PUFs use timing races to produce a rich set of responses. However, these
PUFs are vulnerable to machine-learning attacks due to linear separability of the
output function resulting from the additive nature of timing delay along timing
paths.
We introduce a novel strong silicon PUF based on the exponential current-
voltage behavior in subthreshold region of FET operation. This behaviour injects
strong nonlinearity into the response of the PUF. The PUF, which we term sub-
threshold current array (SCA) PUF, is implemented as a two-dimensional n × k
transistor array with all devices subject to stochastic variability operating in sub-
threshold region. Our PUF is fundamentally different from earlier attempts to inject
nonlinearity via digital control techniques like XORing the outputs of PUF and using
v
feedforward structures, which could also be used with SCA-PUF. Voltages produced
by nominally identical arrays are compared to produce a random binary response.
SCA-PUF shows excellent security properties. The average inter-class Ham-
ming distance, a measure of uniqueness, is 50.3%. The average intra-class Hamming
distance, a measure of response stability, is 0.6%. Crucially, we demonstrate that
the introduced PUF is much less vulnerable to modeling attacks. Using a machine-
learning technique of support-vector machine with radial basis function kernel for
optimum nonlinear learnability, we observe that the “information leakage” (rate of
error reduction with learning) is much lower than for delay-based PUFs. Specif-
ically, over a wide range of the number of observed challenge-response pairs, the
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Many electronic systems require solutions for security, unique identification,
and authentication. As a low cost solution, physical unclonable functions (PUFs)
have been proposed [2, 3]. PUFs are pseudo-random functions that exploit the
randomness inherent in the scaled CMOS technologies to generate random output
strings. In response to an input challenge a PUF generates a binary response.
Because of the randomness of the input-to-output mapping, different PUFs generate
a different response for the same challenge. The set of challenge-response pairs
(CRPs) defines the behavior of a PUF and provides an ability to uniquely identify
it.
Multiple realizations of PUFs have been proposed [2, 4–10]. The key dis-
tinction among different PUF constructions is between strong and weak PUFs. The
distinction is based on the rate at which the number of CRPs grows with the size
of the physical realization of a PUF [11]. Weak PUFs are characterized by a small
number of CRPs, in the extreme case just one fixed challenge. Strong PUFs are
systems with a large number of CRPs, and in an ideal case, the CRP set size grows
exponentially with the size of the PUF. The exponential size of the CRP set makes
it impossible to record the responses for a PUF of a reasonable size.
1
1.1 Motivation
Strong PUFs are essential for public authentication security protocols in
which the number of CRPs needs to be large such that the same CRPs are not re-
used for authentication (preventing the adversary from simply capturing the CRPs
transmitted in plain text and using them for subsequent attacks). However, for a
strong PUF to be an effective security primitive, the CRPs need to be unpredictable:
given a certain set of known challenge-response pairs, it should not be possible to
predict the unobserved CRPs with any reasonable probability. If that is not the
case, an adversary can stage an attack based on building a model of the PUF. A
number of strong PUFs have been proposed in the literature over the years. However,
the unpredictability of responses in published strong PUFs has been shown to be
limited. The earliest example of a strong silicon PUF is the arbiter-based PUF
proposed in [2]. It exploits variation in path delays between gate stages in two
parallel propagation paths to generate a binary response by using an arbiter. The
arbiter-based PUF has been shown to be vulnerable to model-building attacks [12,
13]. In such attacks, machine-learning techniques, such as logistic regression, neural
networks and support vector machines are used to construct a model of the internal
parameters of a PUF based on the observed instances. Attempts to remediate this
vulnerability resulted in several variants of the arbiter-based PUF [5, 6]. These
approaches attempt to improve unpredictability by using digital techniques. In [9],
an XOR gate is used to scramble outputs of two parallel arbiter-based PUFs. In [6],
a feed-forward path is introduced within the arbiter-PUF circuit as a way to inject
nonlinearity. Unfortunately, recent work [12] shows that all of the derivatives of the
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arbiter-based PUF are also vulnerable to model-building attacks, even though the
improved versions require a larger number of observed CRPs for building a model.
In weak PUFs, the number of CRPs typically grows linearly with the PUF
physical size. That implicitly means that each CRP depends on a single, and not
shared, realization of a random physical property. That makes it impossible to
build a model of such a PUF. Several constructions have been demonstrated. The
SRAM-based PUF produces a unique chip signature by relying on threshold voltage
mismatch between cell transistors which leads to a cell settling into a random state
upon powering up the array [7, 8]. The ring oscillator PUF proposed in [9] generates
a response based on the random frequency difference between pairs of ring oscillators.
This work introduces a novel intrinsic strong silicon PUF based on the es-
sential nonlinearity of terminal current-voltage behavior of field-effect transistors
(FETs) at the nanometer scale. The fundamental principle is reliance on the sub-
threshold regime of the FET operation, where current is an exponential function
of threshold voltage, which exhibits strong random intrinsic variability. An addi-
tional nonlinearity is due to the exponential dependence of threshold voltage (1)
on drain-to-source voltage due to drain-induced barrier (DIBL) effect, and (2) on
body-to-source voltage due to body effect. Both of these are used to create coupling
between FETs in the array, further improving nonlinearity and unpredictability.
The new PUF shows excellent security properties.
3
1.2 Prior work
Silicon PUFs came into being with the introduction of the notion of Physical
Random Functions (PRFs) [2]. A Physical Random Function (PUF) is defined as a
function embodied in a physical device that maps the given challenges to responses
and has the following properties:
• Easier Evaluation: The physical device has the capability of evaluating the
function within a finite period of time.
• Hard to characterize: With a limited number of plausible physical measure-
ments or queries of chosen Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs), an adversary
who no longer has an access to the physical device, can only extract negligi-
ble amount of information about the response to a randomly chosen challenge
given finite amount of resources such as time and money.
Physical unclonability is a result of the inherent process variations in the CMOS
manufacturing process, making it impossible to fabricate two ICs with the exact
same physical properties. In a typical application scenario, PUFs are used in two
distinct phases namely the enrollment and verification [3]. During the enrollment
phase, the CRPs generated by a particular PUF are entered into the database.
During the verification phase, a chosen challenge input is applied to the PUF and
its response is compared with the corresponding response from database and is
matched. PUFs are predominantly classified into Strong and Weak PUFs.
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1.2.1 Strong PUF
Strong PUFs support a larger number of CRPs making it impossible to
measure all CRPs within a feasible time frame. Further, the PUF should not be
susceptible to modeling based attacks carried out by adversaries who manage to get
access to few CRPs. Strong PUFs find their application in IC identification and
secuity key generation. Examples of Strong PUF constructs proposed in literature
include Arbiter PUFs, feedforward arbiter PUFs, XOR arbiter PUFs and lightweight
secure PUFs [2, 3, 5, 14].
1.2.1.1 Arbiter PUF
This PUF circuit proposed in [2] exploits the delay variations across chips
to generate unique CRPs. The arbiter PUF circuit consists of a set of delay stages
followed by an arbiter circuit. Each delay stage consists of two multiplexers and
the challenge inputs c1,c2..ck form the select lines of the multiplexers and decide
the path taken by the top and bottom signals. To evaluate the response bit for a
particular challenge, an rising input edge is propagated through the delay stages as
shown in Figure 1.1. The final response bit is dependent upon the arrival times of
the top and bottom signals at the arbiter. In this PUF circuit, a D latch is used as
the arbiter to determine which signal arrives first.
The arbiter PUF circuit implementation is a robust construction which sup-
ports exponential number of CRPs. For example, the circuit in the figure, is capable
of generating 2k CRPs. Another key property of this PUF circuit is that it generates
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Figure 1.1: k-bit Arbiter PUF
hence, the circuit behaviour is expected to be the same across varying environmental
conditions and supply voltage fluctuations.
Numerous modeling approaches have been proposed in the literature to
model the arbiter based PUF. One popular method is to describe the function-
ality of the arbiter-based PUFs is via an additive linear delay model as proposed
in [12–14]. In this model, the authors express the final delay difference ∆ between
the top and the bottom paths in an k-bit arbiter-based PUF as ∆ = wTφ, where w
and φ are of dimensions n+1. The parameter vector w encodes the delay of each of
the delay stage in the arbiter-based PUF and φ is solely a function of the applied
k-bit challenge input C (c1, c2...ck). The final binary response is assigned to 0/1
depending on the sign of (wTφ).
Logistic regression (LR) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are two pop-
ular supervized learning algorithms that have been widely used for carrying out the
modeling based attacks. SVMs [15] map the given training examples to a higher
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dimensional space and estimate the maximum-marginal hyper plane that separates
the sub-sets of challenges producing a 0 and 1 response. LR [16] on the other hand,
uses the maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate the system parame-
ters. The key feature of maximum likelihood estimation is that it estimates values
for parameters which are most likely to have produced the data that have been
observed. In [12], authors evaluate both LR and SVM based modeling attacks on
arbiter-PUFs and its variants. LR is found to have a better performance compared
to the SVM. The authors claim that the approximate number of CRPs NCRP that
is required to learn a k-stage arbiter PUF with an classification error rate of ε is
given by Equation 1.1.
NCRP =
0.5× (k + 1)
ε
(1.1)
1.2.1.2 XOR Arbiter PUFs
One possibility to strengthen the resilience of arbiter-based PUF against
machine learning attacks is proposed in [3]. The main idea is to XOR the l individual
arbiter-PUF outputs in parallel to produce the binary response. All the l-parallel
arbiter-based PUFs are driven by the same set of control inputs c1,c2...ck. Though
the XOR adds non-linearity to the arbiter-based PUF, it was demonstrated in [12]
that even this variant of arbiter-based PUFs is not secure when subjected to a logistic
regression based supervised learning framework. Authors claim that the number of
samples required to break the XOR arbiter-PUF is same as the arbiter-PUF and
follows Equation 1.1. Authors demonstrate their results for l=2,3 and 4.
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1.2.1.3 Feedforward Arbiter PUFs
Another possibility to increase the machine learning resistance of arbiter-
based PUF is proposed in [14]. The main idea here is to derive some of the chal-
lenge inputs internally using the intermediate outputs at delay stages as shown in
Figure 1.2. This construct helps reduce the correlation between the challenge in-
puts and the produced output responses and hence is expected to be more secure
against machine learning based attacks. However, it is demonstrated in [12] that
a learning attack carried out through Evolutionary Strategies [17, 18] helps achieve
higher classification error rates even under this scenario. Evolution Strategies (ES)
are population-based heuristics that use some biological principles to help guide the
search for optimum boundary of separation between 0 and 1.
• Reproduction: New solutions developed at each step of the iteration come out
of existing good solutions.
• Mutation: Mutations can help or hurt the performance of the algorithm. These
mutations keep the gene pool from becoming stagnant and homogenous
• Survival of the fittest: The good solutions in the population are the ones
which are passed on to future iterations. The poor solutions are eliminated
from consideration.
In a model building scenario, an individual in the population is a represen-
tation of the runtime delays of the different delay stages in the PUF. The environ-







Figure 1.2: k-bit FF Arbiter PUF
CRPs of the target PUF on a fixed training set of CRPs. ES runs through several
evolutionary cycles or so-called generations to converge to the optimal parameters.
1.2.2 Weak PUF
Weak PUFs support a limited number of CRPs, sometimes just a single
challenge. These PUFs find their application in crypto systems where you need
secret key generation for authentication and identification. Weak PUFs essentially
are a special form of non-volatile key storage. Their advantage is that they may
be harder to read out invasively than non-volatile memory like EEPROM. Typical
examples include the SRAM PUF [7, 8], Buttery PUF [19] and Coating PUF [20].
9
Chapter 2
New Source of Nonlinearity: FET Subthreshold Current
We develop a principled approach to significantly improve the PUF resilience
against machine-learning attacks. It has been recognized that the limitations of
strong arbiter-based PUFs in terms of unpredictability are due to their linear addi-
tive dependence on partial delays in generating a response. Machine-learning meth-
ods are particularly effective in constructing models of such functions. Machine-
learning algorithms for classification are tasked with classifying an object given a
set of its attributes. In supervised learning setting, the algorithm is first given a
set of training examples in which both the attributes and the label is available. If
the space being learned is naturally linearly separable, it is easy for the learning
algorithm to derive a classification rule with low prediction error.
Unfortunately, the known silicon realizations of PUFs have utilized output
functions that are linear, or nearly linear, in the base random variables. In fact,
delay-based functions are intrinsically poorly suited for this task as (1) the delay
of each stage is near-linear in threshold voltage, and (2) path delays are naturally
additive, and, thus, linear, in delay of each stage. Most strong silicon PUFs known
thus far have been derived from the original work on arbiter PUFs for which the
output can be described as a linear function of the delays of individual stages, as
formalized in [14]. Attempts to introduce nonlinearity in the arbiter-based PUF,
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such as using feed-forward paths or XORing the outputs introduce nonlinearity
through digital means. Empirical results of model-building attacks show that the
added nonlinearity helps but is insufficient in that low prediction errors can still be
achieved. A distinct limitation of at least some digital techniques, those based on
XORing outputs, is that PUF instability increases along with the improvement in
unpredictability [12].
2.1 Injecting Non-Linearity
In order to aid the discussion, we introduce a formal distinction between
the ways of injecting nonlinearity. For most silicon PUFs, a random bit is pro-
duced by evaluating sgn(f(x) − f(y)), where x, y are vectors of realizations of
a random physical parameter. Function f(·) maps the underlying realizations of
physical parameters, e.g., threshold voltages, to a measurable circuit-level quantity,
e.g., delay or voltage. If function f(·) is expressible entirely in terms of real-valued
functions we call it a fully continuous random function (FCRF), otherwise we call
it a mixed continuous-discrete random function (MCDRF). With that distinction
in place, we point out that the above digital techniques of achieving nonlinear-
ity still use delay races as a building block for PUFs with the underlying mecha-
nism of generating pseudo-random behavior remaining linear. Thus, both the XOR
PUF and the FF PUF start with a “native” FCRF-based PUF and ultimately use
the mixed continuous-discrete random function to achieve nonlinearity. Given that
the known digital techniques can be equally applied to other underlying (“native”)
FCRF-based PUFs, the question becomes: can strong silicon PUFs utilizing fully
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continuous random functions be constructed that are significantly more secure than
the FCRF-based delay PUF? We provide an affirmative answer in this work.
The key for engineering a secure silicon PUF is identifying an output function
that would be nonlinear in random variables. We introduce a highly unpredictable
PUF that uses the strongly nonlinear I-V terminal dependencies to generate PUF
responses. Its central feature is that it moves away from the delay/digital imple-
mentation paradigm towards the current/analog one, thereby realizing the necessary
degree of nonlinearity. Because it does not rely on digital techniques for injecting
the nonlinearity, it does not compromise the stability in the output response to
environmental variations.
2.2 Exploiting Nonlinearity of Subthreshold Current
The output function should ideally have two properties: (1) be nonlinear
in random parameters, and (2) introduce the coupling effect in which two or more
random variables interact in producing the output. Both of these properties are
enabled if the binary output is produced by comparing two voltages produced by a
suitably arranged network of FETs operating in subthreshold region. The key to our












where Ids is the drain-to-source subthreshold current, IS is the nominal
current, Vgs is the gate-to-source voltage, Vth is the transistor threshold voltage,
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Vds is the drain-to-source voltage, Vbs is the body-to-source voltage, and λ, γ,
and n are the coefficients of drain-induced barrier lowering and body-bias, and
the subthreshold coefficient respectively. Crucially, the current is exponentially
dependent on the threshold voltage Vth. This is important because Vth exhibits large
and spatially-uncorrelated variability due to random dopant fluctuation (RDF). In
nanometer scale CMOS devices, RDF is very significant and grows with transistor
scaling [21, 22]. Equation 2.1 also captures the impact of physical mechanisms of
drain-induced barrier lowering and of body effect which lead to a dependence of Vth
on Vds and Vbs. In the second part of the equation, we use a linear expansion of Vth
in terms of Vds and Vbs to enable closed-form analysis.
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Chapter 3
Subthreshold Current Array PUF
3.1 Array PUF Architecture
We now present a transistor-level realization of a subthreshold current array
PUF (SCA-PUF) that exploits the current behavior in Equation 2.1 to construct a
highly secure strong PUF. Figure 3.1 depicts the overall architecture of the SCA-
PUF. The PUF is implemented as a two-dimensional transistor array with all devices
subject to stochastic variability operating in subthreshold region. The 2D organi-
zation allows to maximize the reliability and security properties of the PUF, as
demonstrated by experiments.
Each PUF consists of two nominally identical arrays. The array schematic
is shown in Figure 3.2. The array is composed of k columns and n rows of a unit
cell. We use the term “stochastic” transistor to refer to a device with high amount
of threshold voltage variability. The unit cell consists of a stochastic subthreshold
nFET, which is a transistor with a highly variable threshold voltge that always
operates in the subthreshold region. A non-stochastic switch transistor is arranged
in parallel to the stochastic FET. The non-stochastic transistor M0 acts as a load
device and operates in the subthreshold region (its gate terminal is tied to ground).
At the bottom of each column of cells is a footer transistor Miy controlled by
Ci1Ci2 . . . Cin. Its role is to ensure that there is never a low-impedance path to
14
ground from Vout.
Both array blocks are driven with the same set of control inputs and thus in
the absence of variability produce identical voltages. The randomness of transistor
threshold voltages leads to the differences in two output voltages. The binary re-
sponse is generated by comparing the output voltages produced by the two arrays
via a comparator. The size of the CRP set is 2kn, making it a strong PUF.
3.1.1 Circuit Construction
We now describe in greater detail the building block of the array, the unit
cell. In each cell, which we identify using a column index i and a row index j, an
NMOS transistor Mij always operates in the subthreshold region: its gate terminal
is tied to ground. An NMOS transistor Mijx, in parallel with Mij, acts as a
switch transistor. Careful sizing of both devices is essential for correct operation.
Two requirements need to be satisfied. First, only transistor Mij is subject to
significant variation of threshold voltage due to random dopant fluctuation. This is
achieved by sizing tranistors Mij to their minimum size to maximize their threshold
voltage variability according to Pelgrom’s model [23]. Second, the subthreshold
current through the switch transistor Mijx needs to be negligible compared to the
subthreshold current through Mij. At the same time, Mijx needs to have small on-
state resistance. These requirements can be met, for example, with W = 10Wmin
and L = 10Lmin. Because the nominal current IS in the subthreshold region is
exponentially dependent on channel length Ids(Mijx)/Ids(Mij) ≈ 0 when Cij = 0.









Figure 3.1: PUF architecture.
zero. In this case, the impact of the stochastic transistor is effectively “removed” in
that its contribution to the branch current is eliminated. At the same time, when
the switch transistor is off, because its subthreshold current is negligible compared
to the stochastic transistor, its contribution to the total current can be ignored.
Depending on the control input, the stochastic transistor therefore is either part
of the pull-down network and contributes current that depends on its threshold
voltage, or does not impact total current flowing through a branch. Thus, each
branch can have 2n current values.
3.2 Analysis of Array Nonlinearity
The principle feature of the circuit we propose is that it has a highly non-
linear boundary between the regions of PUF 1-outputs and 0-outputs in the kn-
dimensional space of Vth. In this chapter, we more formally analyze the nonlinearity
of the SCA-PUF. To enable analytical treatment, we derive equations for two spe-
cial cases: (a) a single-column array, (b) a single-row array, and (c) a simple 2D
16
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Figure 3.2: Circuit schematic of the 2D subthreshold current array.
array with k = 2 and n = 2. We aim to bring out the form of the nonlinearity
involved in each of the two special cases (a) and (b). The two special cases of the
2D array exhibit distinct forms of nonlinearity which, when combined within a 2D
array structure, form a rich nonlinear space.
3.2.1 Single row array
First, we consider the single-row (parallel-only) array with two columns (n =
1, k = 2). To be able to derive a closed-form equation relating Vout to threshold
voltages of two “stochastic” transistors, we assume that Vds >100 mV. For n = 1
we can also ignore the impact of the body-bias effect. With that, Equation 2.1 can
be written as:
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Figure 3.3: Response nonlinearity in the single-row array: nonlinearity of additive







Vgs − Vth + λVds
S
For convenience, we use a simplified notation where Vth,M0 = V0 and similar






[log(IS) + λVdd − V0 − log(I0)]
Applying KCL at node Vout, I0 = I11 + I21, where I11, I21 are the currents
through M11 and M21, and describing these currents using Equation 1, we can




















Equation 3.1 is a transcendental equation. The key to our construction is
the nonlinearity of Vout in terms of values of threshold voltages of transistors M11
and M21. The nonlinearity of Equation 3.1 is explored in Figure 3.3.
3.2.2 Single column array
Next we consider the single-column array (k = 1) with only two rows (n = 2).
It represents a subthreshold current array with series-only “stochastic” transistors
M11 and M12. Using Equation 2.1 for transistors M0, M11 and M12 respectively,














































We also know that I0 = I11 = I12. Unfortunately, expressing Vout in closed
form appears infeasible. By simultaneously solving the system of Equations 3.2,
3.3 and 3.4 numerically, we generate Figure 3.4 and observe the nonlinearity of the
19
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Figure 3.4: Response nonlinearity in the single-column array: nonlinearity of series-
connected subthreshold FETs. based on 3.4
single-column (series-only) array topology. The nonlinearity is significant. Notably,
while the nonlinear separating surface of the parallel-only array is convex, the surface
separating 0- and 1-regions in the series-only array is concave.
3.2.3 2x2 array
Finally, we consider the 2 × 2 array. We treat the source (drain) of M11
(M12) as node Vx and source (drain) of M21 (M22) as node Vy. Using Equation
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Additionally, we have I11 = I21 and I12 = I22, and I0 = I11 + I12. Simulta-
neously solving these equations, along with the system of Equations 3.5-3.9, using
Matlab numerical package, we show the resulting nonlinearity of Vout in Figure 3.5.
In the next chapter, we show that the effect of the created strong nonlinearities is
a PUF whose input-ouput behavior is difficult to model through observation of a
partial list of CRPs.



















Figure 3.5 is generated by solving Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 simul-
taneously and illustrates the nonlinearity of hybrid PUF primitive.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of PUF Security Properties via
Transistor-Level Simulations
4.1 Simulation setup
The performance of the proposed SCA-PUF was simulated using SPICE,
the industry-standard transistor-level circuit simulator, in a 45 nm technology node
using the predictive technology models [24–26]. The source of randomness is in Vth
variability assumed to be caused by random dopant fluctuation and therefore to
be spatially uncorrelated. The threshold voltages are assumed to follow a normal
distribution with a mean value of 250 mV and a standard deviation of 40 mV, a
value consistent with ITRS data [27]. The results are based on the output random
string generated by the PUF having the length of 128 bits.
4.2 PUF metrics
There are several commonly used metrics that quantify the goodness of a
PUF [28]. The inter-class Hamming distance (HD) is a measure of the ability to
differentiate two different PUFs under the same input. Ideally, each PUF produces
an entirely unique response, and thus the ideal inter-class HD normalized to the
total number of bits in the output is 0.5. Intra-class HD is the measure of the
reliability of a PUF and quantifies how much response of a given PUF changes
23






















Figure 4.1: Inter, Intra HD for Parallel PUF























Figure 4.2: Inter, Intra HD for Series PUF
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Figure 4.3: Inter, Intra HD for Hybrid PUF
under a different set of environmental conditions. Ideally, the intra-class HD is
0. Reliability of the PUF responses across different environmental conditions was
studied for supply voltage variation of 5% and temperature ranging from −40 ◦C to
85 ◦C. Monte-Carlo simulation sample size used to extract inter-class HD was 1000.
The previous chapter has shown that the nonlinear behavior implemented in
the 2D subthreshold current array is a combination of the nonlinearities of the single-
row array which represents a parallel-only combination of stochastic subthreshold
FETs, and the single-column array which represents a series-only combination of
stochastic subthreshold FETs. The series-only and the parallel-only combinations
lead to different types of nonlinearities. In principle, the SCA-PUF can be imple-
mented via a variety of n× k array dimensions. For example, a PUF with the same
CRP space of 2nk can be implemented as either n × k or nk × 1 or 1 × nk array.
The latter two types would correspond to the parallel-only and series-only combi-
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nations. Therefore, it is important to investigate the behavior of different possible
array organizations with respect to PUF security and reliability metrics.
Figure 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 shows the histograms of the normalized intra-class and
inter-class HDs. The mean values are summarized in Table 4.1. We observe that the
mean inter-class HD for all three cases is excellent and is practically indistinguishable
from 0.5. Intra-class HD is excellent for a parallel-only array but is noticeably
higher for the series-only array. Interestingly, when the two types of nonlinearity
are combined within the 2D array, intra-class HD is still excellent (below 0.01).
Another useful measure of the goodness of a PUF is the uniformity metric
defined by [28]. In an ideal PUF, the fraction of challenges that produces a response
of 1 and of 0 should be equal. A useful, and closely, related metric is randomness,
as defined by [29], which also quantifies uniformity but in a min-entropy sense.
The histograms of the uniformity metric are shown in Figure 4.4, 4.5, 4.6. For
comparison, Table 4.2 summarizes the figures of merit for several published PUFs.
Table 4.1: Average inter-class and intra-class Hamming distance, uniformity, and
randomness for σVos = 7 mV.
Parameter Single-row Single-column 2D array
Inter-class HD 0.493 0.498 0.503
Intra-class HD 0.009 0.076 0.006
Uniformity 0.514 0.507 0.514
Randomness 0.386 0.382 0.439
Model-building attacks are the tool with which an adversary may attempt
to overcome the authentication guarantees offered by PUFs. Therefore, the ability
of a PUF to withstand model-building attacks has been suggested as the ultimate
26


























Figure 4.4: Distribution of the uniformity metric across PUF instances for parallel
PUF primitive


























Figure 4.5: Distribution of the uniformity metric across PUF instances for series
primitive
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of the uniformity metric across PUF instances for hybrid
primitive
measure of their security [12]. These attacks rely on the power of machine-learning
algorithms to model the inner parameters of PUFs through observation of a small
set of CRPs. In [12], the effectiveness of machine-learning attacks is investigated
using a support vector machine (SVM) algorithm. Open-source LIBSVM software
was used [30]. A set of challenge inputs, along with their output responses, is used
as a training set to estimate the PUF model parameters. The estimated model is
used to compute the predicted output response for the non-training challenge inputs
and the prediction error rate ε is measured. The procedure is carried out for several
training sample sets of different size. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the comparison
of prediction error vs. training set size for 8 bit and 16 bit PUFs respectively. To
maximize the learning ability of the SVM algorithm, we employed a nonlinear radial
basis function (RBF) kernel. Using a nonlinear kernel makes SVM more effective in
28
Table 4.2: Average intra-class and inter-class HD for PUFs reported in the literature
[1].
PUF type Inter HD (%) Intra HD (%)
Optical PUF 49.79 25.25
Coating PUF ≈50 <5
Basic arbiter PUF 23 <5
Feed-forward arbiter PUF 38 9.8
Basic Ring Oscillator PUF ≈1 ≈0.01
Ring Oscillator PUF w/ comparator 46.14 0.48
SRAM PUF 49.97 <12
Latch PUF 50.55 3.04
Butterfly PUF ≈50 <6
Sense Amplifier PUF 50.00 6
nonlinear classification problems. We further used a 5-fold cross-validation scheme
to select the best kernel parameters. The results indicate that the SCA-PUF is
significantly more secure than the delay based PUF. The prediction error is almost
an order of magnitude higher than for the arbiter PUF. As we argued earlier, the
digital techniques of injecting nonlinearity can be thought of as qualitatively distinct
from the behavior of the “native” PUF. For that reason we focus on comparing SCA-
PUF behavior to the arbiter PUF learning behavior only. We again note that digital
control techniques like feeedforwarding and XORing of multiple PUF outputs could
also be applied to SCA-PUF, and would further enhance its native nonlinearity and
security.
4.2.1 Effect of comparator offset on PUF metrics
Another practical aspect that we investigate is the influence of comparator
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Figure 4.8: Classification error from modeling a 16-bit PUF via an SVM-based
attack.
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 Square 2D array
 
Figure 4.9: Cumulative distribution of |∆V | for three array topologies.
the two outputs depends on the realizations of random threshold voltages. In an
ideal comparator, the binary output matches perfectly the sign of |∆V | at any
magnitude. In practice, we need to take into account the effect of comparator offset
voltage. Offset voltage effectively determines the resolution of the comparator and
it may also impact the security properties of the SCA-PUF. We first investigate the
distribution of the actual observed voltage differences that the comparator needs
to resolve. The mean |∆V | is 14.3 mV, 48.5 mV and 14.5 mV respectively for the
parallel-only, series-only, and 2D array SCA-PUFs. Figure 4.9 shows the lower tail
of the cumulative distribution of |∆V | for three array topologies.
We study the impact of offset voltage on PUFs properties by assuming it fol-
lows a normal distribution with a mean of 0 mV and a standard deviation of several
mVs. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the effect of offset voltage on intra-class Hamming
distance and on the randomness measure. The inter-class Hamming distance was
found to remain nearly-constant around 0.5 for all three circuit constructs. Based
31
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Figure 4.10: Dependence of intra-class HD on offset voltage spread.
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Figure 4.11: Dependence of randomness on offset voltage spread.
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on this exploration, we find that a comparator that has an offset voltage of up to
σV os = 7 mV would be acceptable but a wider offset distribution would significantly
deteriorate randomness. A comparator with such offset can be designed using a
strong-arm sense amplifier topology proposed in [31]. Achieving the offset standard
deviation of about 7 mV will require either sizing the active devices of the sense
amplifier to about 100X of the minimum transistor size or using offset cancellation
techniques, both of which are easily realizable.
4.3 Comparator design
The typical strong-arm sense amplifier topology proposed in [31] is highly
sensitive to the process variations and typically has a large spread in the input offset
voltage at deep sub-micron technology nodes. One way to reduce the offset voltage
is by increasing the size of the transistors, but achieving σV os = 7 mV may require
ridiculously high amount of area which is not acceptable. We therefore resorted to
offset cancellation techniques. Figure 4.12 shows the schematic of the two-phased
comparator that we implemented. The inverters I1, I2, I3, I4 and I5 act as the
amplifiers and the capacitors C1, C2 and C3 act as the offset sampling capacitors.
During phase 1 when φ is high, the potential at node x is equal to the input voltage
vin2 and all the inverters are in the diode connected mode. The capacitors C2
and C3 sample the offset voltage of I2 and I3 respectively, whereas the capacitor
C1 samples the difference in potential between node X and the offset voltage of
I1. During phase 2 when φ is high, the node X gets the voltage input vin1 and











Figure 4.12: Offset cancelled comparator.



















Figure 4.13: Input referred offset voltage after Offset cancellation.
voltage gets divided by the gain of the inverter, thus helping us achieve a much
reduced effective offset voltage. The impact of charge sharing noise is minimized by
adding dummy switches and by choosing the capacitors C1, C2 and C3 to be much
greater than the clock feedthrough capacitance. The thermal noise voltages in phase
1 and phase 2 were found to be 1 µV and 0.8 µV respectively. Figure 4.13 shows
the histogram of input referred offset voltage after the offset cancellation described
above based on 100 monte carlo runs. An 3 σV os = 1 mV was achieved through
the circuit. The main advantage of this circuit is the simplicity of its construction




Secure storage of secret keys and the secure implementation of algorithms
and architectures withstanding physical attacks represent one of the main challenges
that confront the security community. Physical Unclonable Functions that utilize
the inherent process variations in the modern CMOS fabrication process have been
proposed as a low cost solution for providing secure authentication. The Arbiter-
PUFs were one of the earlier design solutions proposed to act as PUFs. However,
recent research reveals that the Arbiter-based PUFs and its variants obtained by
feedforwarding and XORing the outputs are highly susceptible to the machine learn-
ing attacks. In this thesis, we introduce a novel silicon PUF based on the essential
nonlinearity of responses produced by the physics of field-effect transistors (FETs)
at the nanometer scale. The proposed PUF named Subthreshold Current array PUF
(SCA PUF) is constructed with two identical copies of the arrays of transistors, with
each array capable of generating an analog voltage and a comparator circuit which
compares the two generated voltages to produce a binary response. We show a proof
of the nonlinearity in its output response by solving a system of equations which
relate the mosfet currents and voltages in the subthreshold regime for the transistors
in the SCA PUF.
The proposed PUF circuit is simulated in the 45 nm Predictive Technology
35
Models (PTM) and is found to exhibit excellent values for the common PUF metrics
such as inter Hamming Distance, intra Hamming Distance, uniformity and random-
ness. We also demonstrate that when the SCA PUF is subjected to model building
attacks through SVM-based learning algorithms, the prediction error rate is about
3−35x higher compared to the arbiter based PUF. Finally we present the impact of
offset voltage distribution on the comparator and its overall effect on the different
PUF metrics.
5.1 Future Work
While the SCA PUF is shown to be secure against SVM based modeling
attacks, it may become susceptible to other learning algorithms. Therefore, we
hope to extend our study into the performance of the SCA PUF when subjected
to other popular machine learning algorithms such as neural networks and logistic
regression. We would also like to compare the performance of SCA PUF against the
variants of the arbiter-based PUFs equipped with XORing and feedforwarding. One
other research direction is to evaluate how the performance of SCA PUF changes
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